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 Abstract 
As the 1950s began, Western European defense policy posed unique challenges for the 
United States.  At the outset of the Cold War, U.S. officials recognized that maintaining a free 
Western Europe was vital to the long-term survival of the United States against the Soviet Union 
and its satellite nations.  While America could rely on its long-range nuclear bombers (and, in a 
few years, its intercontinental ballistic missiles) as a deterrent to Soviet aggression against the 
continental United States, the situation in Europe was more complicated.  The North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO), first organized in 1949, was the defense pact designed to counter 
the Soviet Bloc in Eastern Europe.  The NATO alliance, however, still recovering from the 
destruction of the Second World War, was in no condition to oppose Soviet aggression at the end 
of 1950.   Yet by 1955, the situation in Europe was dramatically different.  The NATO allies had 
transformed from a loose confederation of weak nations to a strong international alliance capable 
of confronting the Communist forces if necessary.   
At the center of this transformation was Dwight D. Eisenhower.  In January 1951, 
Eisenhower assumed the position of NATO‘s first Supreme Allied Commander, Europe 
(SACEUR) and spent nearly two years strengthening the Western European alliance.  Then, after 
entering the White House as president in 1953, Eisenhower used his experiences as SACEUR to 
reinforce several aspects of his own defense policy.  Ultimately, several key aspects of 
Eisenhower‘s ―New Look‖ defense policy (such as the continued emphasis of the NATO 
alliance) had their antecedents in Eisenhower‘s service as NATO Supreme Commander. 
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Introduction  
During the 1950s, Presidents Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower solidified an 
American defense strategy that lasted for several decades.  In the aftermath of the Second World 
War, Truman emphasized maintaining a sound economy, building the strategic nuclear capability 
of the U.S. Air Force (USAF), and increasing the strength of America‘s allies, especially those in 
Western Europe.  After ascending to the presidency himself, Eisenhower continued to use 
Truman‘s framework under the policy that became known as the ―New Look‖ strategy.  
Eisenhower had the same objectives: keeping the American economy strong, expanding the 
strategic nuclear deterrent of the USAF, and strengthening the NATO coalition.  
The difference between Truman and Eisenhower‘s defense policy was in the execution of 
these strategic concepts.  After the beginning of the Korean War, Truman came to rely on the 
containment policy advocated by George F. Kennan and codified in the document NSC-68.  
George F. Kennan, a distinguished U.S. diplomat and leading theorist on U.S.-Soviet relations in 
the Cold War, viewed the Soviet Union as inherently expansionist.  Following Kennan‘s views, 
NSC-68 was a policy document generated by the National Security Council (NSC) as a 
recommendation for future American actions in the Cold War.  Viewing the United States and 
the Soviet Union (USSR) as inherently in conflict, NSC-68 interpreted the ultimate Soviet goal 
to be worldwide domination.  The document also estimated that by 1954 the USSR would have 
enough atomic bombs (and means of delivery) to offset the U.S. nuclear arsenal.
1
  NSC-68 
concluded that the chief limitation of American power was a lack of conventional military force, 
thus providing justification for a great expansion of U.S. military forces based on the view that 
1954 was the ―year of maximum danger‖ of a Soviet attack.2  The result of this policy was that 
the size of the U.S. military was set to double from 1.5 million personnel in 1950 to 3.3 million 
by 1954.
3
   
                                               
1 Douglas Kinnard, President Eisenhower and Strategy Management (Lexington: University Press of 
Kentucky, 1977), 6. 
2 Ibid., 7-8. 
3 ―FY 1951 End Strengths Authorized and Budgeted,‖ Doris M. Condit, History of the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense Volume II: The Test of War 1950-1953 (Washington, D.C.: Historical Office of the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense, 1988), 240. 
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Eisenhower took a different stance.  Instead of perceiving the Soviets as an enemy poised 
to attack immediately, Eisenhower believed the Soviet Union would not attack the West for the 
foreseeable future.  As he wrote in his journal in January 1952, Eisenhower believed that, ―There 
is no greater probability of war [with the Soviet Union] today than there was two years ago; and 
no one can say for certain that there is any greater probability of deliberately provoked war at the 
end of this year or of the next than there is now.‖4  Thus, Eisenhower thought that there was no 
need for the United States to incur the deficit spending likely to result from the NSC-68 budgets, 
which provoke the presumed dangers of inflation.  Eisenhower assumed that federal spending in 
excess of income would cause inflation, which would in turn disrupt the American economy.
5
  
Re-emphasizing the equipping of foreign armies, moving American troops back to the United 
States from their overseas stations, and relying on nuclear weapons to deter aggression offered 
Eisenhower ways to save money in the hopes of achieving a balanced budget.  Eisenhower 
disagreed with Truman‘s execution of his strategy after the outbreak of the Korean War, but not 
the entirety of the framework itself. 
Interpretations of Eisenhower‘s thought process regarding the ―New Look‖ vary.  Some 
authors have pointed to Eisenhower‘s economic concerns as the primary factor in his national 
security thinking.  In Eisenhower: Soldier and President (1990), Stephen Ambrose insisted that 
domestic economics dominated Eisenhower‘s thoughts, stating, ―All of Eisenhower‘s major 
goals—peace, lower taxes, a balanced budget, no inflation were dependent upon his cutting the 
defense budget.‖6  Michael Hogan argued the same in A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the 
Origins of the National Security State (1998).  He explained that, ―Eisenhower … [was] 
convinced defense spending would exhaust the Treasury, bankrupt the taxpayer, and end in 
destructive inflation or economic controls.‖7  Even the contemporary renowned economist James 
                                               
4 Dwight D. Eisenhower, ―Diary Entry, 22 January 1952,‖ The Eisenhower Diaries, ed. by Robert H. 
Ferrell (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1981), 213.   
5 Robert M. Collins, More: The Politics of Economic Growth in Postwar America (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), 55. 
6 Stephen Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier and President (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), 321. 
7 Michael Hogan, A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 474-5. 
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Tobin asserted in his 1958 article ―Defense, Dollars, and Doctrines‖ that the ―New Look‖ was a 
doctrine ―made as much in Treasury as in State.‖8 
Other historians have emphasized that Eisenhower‘s talented advisers shaped the 
president‘s thinking.  Douglas Kinnard argued in President Eisenhower and Strategy 
Management: A Study in Defense Politics (1977) that Eisenhower managed ―a very powerful set 
of political and military appointees‖ to create the ―New Look.‖9  John Lewis Gaddis concluded 
in Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security 
Policy (1982) that the ―curious Eisenhower-Dulles ‗partnership‘‖ created the ―New Look.‖10  
According to Gaddis, while ―Eisenhower largely defined the interests his administration sought,‖ 
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles shaped the ―prevailing [U.S.] perception of threat[s]‖ 
imposed by the Soviet Union.
11
  The ―New Look,‖ according to Gaddis, was in essence a 
combination of the views of Eisenhower and Dulles. 
The above interpretations are certainly valid analyses of Eisenhower‘s thinking on 
national security.  Yet these interpretations largely overlook a critical factor that influenced the 
―New Look.‖  As pointed out by General Andrew J. Goodpaster, Staff Secretary to Eisenhower 
in 1954-1961, the key aspects of the ―New Look‖ were ―foreshadowed in Eisenhower‘s service 
as commander of NATO in 1951 and 1952.‖12  Prior to becoming president, Eisenhower spent 
nearly eighteen months as the first Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).  In this capacity as the top military commander of NATO, 
Eisenhower gained experience implementing Truman‘s defense policy that reinforced 
Eisenhower‘s own economic thinking during the formation of the ―New Look‖ and guided his 
actions while implementing the ―New Look‖ in Western Europe.  
After leaving NATO for the Oval Office, Eisenhower spent the majority of his first year 
as president defining his defense policy.  A major part of the ―New Look‖ was the necessity of 
reducing the number of personnel in the U.S. military.  While his comments clearly demonstrate 
that he understood the economic benefits of a small military, evidence indicates that 
                                               
8 James Tobin, ―Defense, Dollars, and Doctrines,‖ The Yale Review 47 (March 1958); 324-25; as cited in 
Collins, More: The Politics of Economic Growth in Postwar America, 55. 
9 Kinnard, President Eisenhower and Strategy Management,  136.  
10 John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 129. 
11 Ibid., 136. 
12 General Andrew J. Goodpaster, ―Foreword,‖ in Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring 
Cold War Strategy, Richard R. Bowie and Richard H. Immerman (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), v.  
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Eisenhower‘s experience as SACEUR strengthened his belief in the wisdom of a small military.  
As SACEUR, Eisenhower had firsthand knowledge of the growing strength of NATO‘s military 
forces.  Additionally, Eisenhower‘s time working with NATO also made him extremely wary of 
how the Cold War situation in Europe affected Allied perceptions of American action concerning 
NATO.  A larger U.S. military could cause the Western Europeans to reduce their own troop 
commitments to NATO in favor of more American troops.  These views, reinforced by his 
service as NATO Supreme Commander, underpinned Eisenhower‘s stance on the size of the U.S. 
military. 
Another major topic of the ―New Look‖ was the potential use of tactical nuclear weapons 
in Europe.  Eisenhower made the immediate use of tactical nuclear weapons a cornerstone of the 
―New Look‖ as a way to deter Soviet aggression against Western Europe.  Although he did not 
leave behind much evidence detailing the progression of his thoughts on nuclear weapons, 
Eisenhower dealt extensively with the possible use of nuclear weapons in Western Europe as 
SACEUR.  As NATO‘s top military commander, Eisenhower received briefings on tactical 
nuclear weapons, and at one point the American Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) gave Eisenhower 
complete control over targeting priorities for nuclear weapons in Europe.
13
  Although he did not 
discuss this experience much as president, it is reasonable to assume that this experience 
influenced Eisenhower‘s thinking while working through the details of the ―New Look.‖ 
Once he outlined the ―New Look‖ with the help of his national security staff, 
Eisenhower‘s experiences as SACEUR also shaped how he chose to implement this policy in 
Western Europe.  Eisenhower thought that part of the solution to making NATO stronger was 
developing greater cohesion among the NATO allies.  Eisenhower‘s time as SACEUR convinced 
him that the only way to achieve this unity was through an organization known as the European 
Defense Community (EDC).  The EDC Treaty called for the Western European Allies to create a 
supra-national army that combined troops from all nations under a single military structure.  
Eisenhower believed this supra-national organization would lay the groundwork for natural 
progression toward a unified Europe.  Consequently, Eisenhower aggressively pursued 
ratification of the EDC as president. 
                                               
13 Dwight D. Eisenhower, The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, Vol. XIII, ed. by Louis P. Galambos 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1989), 1226. 
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Eisenhower‘s experience working with the NATO Allies also shaped his approach to 
integrating tactical nuclear weapons into the Western European alliance.  Some officials in the 
U.S. government, particularly among the Joint Chiefs, advocated that nuclear weapons remain 
under control of American forces only.
14
  Eisenhower‘s experience caused him to take a more 
open approach, however.  He constantly stressed that the United States had to trust the NATO 
allies more; consequently, he worked for U.S. legislation allowing greater sharing of nuclear 
information with America‘s allies.  In these two aspects, Eisenhower‘s service at NATO 
Headquarters influenced his implementation of the ―New Look.‖ 
When using primary evidence to compare Eisenhower‘s thoughts on national defense 
from his time at NATO with his service as president, it becomes evident that Eisenhower‘s 
experiences as NATO played an important role in the creation and realization of some pieces of 
the ―New Look‖ policy.  Earlier works have not fully explored the continuity between these two 
offices held by Eisenhower.  Stephen Ambrose and John Lewis Gaddis, for example, only briefly 
mention Eisenhower‘s service as SACEUR when discussing Eisenhower‘s support of the EDC 
and NATO in general.
15
  As a result, the historical interpretation of Eisenhower‘s role in the 
―New Look‖ is skewed.  Ultimately, analyzing this continuity provides a broader understanding 
of both the inner working of the Eisenhower White House and the ―New Look‖ policy as a 
whole.  
This essay starts by analyzing the prominent themes of Eisenhower‘s service as SACEUR 
during the period from January 1951 through May 1952.  The second chapter then moves into 
Eisenhower‘s first year as president and interprets how his eighteen-month service at NATO 
Headquarters influenced some of Eisenhower‘s stances on the ―New Look‖ policy.  Finally, the 
third chapter examines how Eisenhower‘s time as NATO Supreme Commander shaped his 
approach on implementing the ―New Look‖ in Europe.   
The majority of the primary documents in the essay were drawn from collections at the 
Eisenhower Presidential Library in Abilene, Kansas, or from printed documents in the Foreign 
Relations of the United States series published by the Department of State.  This essay also 
draws upon primary evidence published in The Eisenhower Diaries edited by Robert H. Ferrell, 
The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower edited by Louis P. Galambos, and the Public Papers of 
                                               
14 Ibid. 
15
 Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier and President , 301, 334; Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 127. 
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the Presidents of the United States, 1953, compiled by the U.S. National Archives.  Finally, this 
essay uses a variety of secondary books and articles listed in the bibliography to support various 
points of the argument.      
 7 
 
CHAPTER 1 - Eisenhower as NATO Supreme Commander, 
December 1950-May 1952 
When he accepted the nomination to become the first SACEUR of NATO in December 
1950, General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower called it ―a job of transcendent importance to 
the United States.‖16  He shared President Truman‘s conviction that ―Western Europe is the 
keystone of the defensive arch we are trying to build up.‖17  Indeed, Eisenhower remarked to the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee in January 1951 that strengthening the NATO Alliance was 
a task he was ―willing to devote the rest of [his] life to try to make work.‖18  Yet though the 
twelve NATO countries had ratified the North Atlantic Treaty in April 1949 with full American 
support, the Alliance had made little progress toward stable collective security in the succeeding 
year and a half.
19
  Meanwhile, the Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellites were 
increasing in strength at a much faster rate.  By the end of 1950, it was clear that NATO needed a 
strong and trustworthy leader to build the alliance into an effective counterpoint to the Soviet 
bloc.  To fill this critical positions, Truman called Eisenhower out of retirement and offered him 
the newly created post of NATO Supreme Commander.
20
 
Eisenhower went to NATO Headquarters ready to carry out Truman‘s policy toward 
Europe: make the Western European Allies strong enough to defend themselves.  While he had 
some idea of the challenges ahead from experiences with a coalition during the Second World 
War, NATO command introduced Eisenhower to the dynamics of a European alliance in the 
Cold War environment.  Building the NATO Alliance into a viable defensive organization would 
require all of Eisenhower‘s skills as a military commander and diplomat.  Ultimately, as he 
worked to enact Truman‘s policy, Eisenhower‘s experiences at NATO reinforced his conviction 
                                               
16 Chester J. Pach, Jr. and Elmo Richardson, The Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower, rev. ed. (Lawrence: 
University Press of Kansas, 1991), 2. 
17 Letter from Eisenhower to President Harry Truman, 16 December 1950, Dwight David Eisenhower 
Library (DDEL), Dwight David Eisenhower (DDE) Papers, Pre-Presidential 1916-52, Box 116, Truman File #2. 
18 Condit, History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense Volume II: The Test of War 1950-1953,  340. 
19 Ibid., 309. 
20
 Ibid., 334. 
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that the United States needed to continue to support the NATO alliance, a belief that would 
shape Eisenhower‘s efforts as president.  
Eisenhower‘s job as SACEUR was building a conventional (non-nuclear) army that could 
defend Western Europe against Soviet attack.  While the United States had been nuclear-capable 
since mid-1945, its nuclear stockpile was still quite small when Eisenhower left for Europe 
(despite Truman‘s appropriation of more than $2 billion for atomic weapons research in 1949).21  
Additionally, the NATO defense concept Truman had accepted in January 1950 stipulated that 
strategic air power based within the United States would provide the nuclear deterrent to Soviet 
aggression in Europe.
22
  Consequently, Eisenhower‘s primary concern was strengthening the 
conventional military power of NATO.  
Eisenhower began his duties by conducting a tour of the allied capitals in January 1951 
with two purposes in mind: 1) to bolster allied morale by confirming the American commitment 
to European defense and 2) to investigate the current state of the conventional forces he would 
command as SACEUR.  In his earliest conversations with Truman concerning NATO, 
Eisenhower made it clear that one of the most pressing tasks the United States faced in Europe 
was raising the morale of the allied nations.  In a letter to President Truman dated 16 December 
1950, Eisenhower stated, ―The most pressing thing needed in Western Europe is the will to 
fight—confidence.  It is in this realization that we have … engaged ourselves to participate in the 
defense of that region.‖23  From the very beginning, perhaps as a result of his World War II 
experience as the Allied Supreme Commander, Eisenhower was well aware of the intangible 
effects an American commitment would have.   
Eisenhower also agreed with Truman that the United States was unable to allocate 
enough American troops to defend the entirety of Europe.  While he had hoped for as many as 
twenty U.S. divisions in December 1950 and actually asked for ten to twelve the following 
                                               
21 Ibid., 467. 
22 ―Memorandum from Secretary of North Atlantic Defense Committee (NADC) to NADC,‖ FRUS 1949, 
Vol IV, ―Western Europe,‖ 355; see also Condit, History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense Volume II: The 
Test of War 1950-1953, 311, and David Alan Rosenberg, ―The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American 
Strategy,‖ paper presented at the US Military Academy, 21 April 1982, published within The National Security: Its 
Theory and Practice, 1945-1960, ed. Norman A. Graebner (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 133.  
Beginning in 1949, the Joint Chiefs of Staff assigned the U.S. Air Force‘s Strategic Air Command (organized by the 
Air Force in hopes of becoming America‘s primary nuclear delivery force) to retard any Soviet advances into 
Western Europe. 
23
 Eisenhower to Truman, 16 December 1950, p. 3.  
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month, Eisenhower insisted that the U.S. reinforcements were only a part of the defense plan 
requiring the NATO Allies to provide fifty to sixty divisions themselves.
24
  Further restricting 
the United States from reinforcing NATO was the Korean War.  As Eisenhower commented in 
his December letter to President Truman, ―Now we have engaged to assume national 
responsibility for command in [Western Europe], but we have done this at a time when we are 
badly extended in the East and there is only a modicum of readily available strength in the 
United States.‖25     
The challenge facing Eisenhower was enormous.  During his initial tour, Eisenhower 
found that there were fewer than fifteen divisions of questionable readiness and only 1,000 
aircraft of various types to defend all of NATO.  One British officer in occupied West Germany 
remarked in May 1950 that only the two U.S. divisions (out of the fifteen available) were combat 
ready.
26
  Meanwhile, NATO intelligence estimated that the Soviets had at least twenty-five 
divisions and 6,000 aircraft in Eastern Europe alone (with many more units and aircraft available 
in the Soviet Union proper).
27
  Even after Eisenhower received another four U.S. divisions 
(instead of the ten to twelve he requested), thereby raising the total U.S. commitment to six 
divisions, the Soviets still held a large manpower advantage.
28
   
Eisenhower also quickly concluded upon arriving in Europe that, even if Truman had 
wanted to, the massive effort required for the United States to compete on an even basis with the 
Soviet Union was likely beyond American capabilities (though this conclusion was perhaps self-
evident to Eisenhower, as one of the American assumptions regarding NATO was that the 
Europeans would expand their own defense commitments
29
).  In speaking with the Belgian 
Prime Minister, Eisenhower explained that to help defend Europe the United States was 
―planning for the largest fleet any nation has ever had in peace time, and a very large air force of 
some 90 groups.  We expect, under present plans, to have some 3,500,000 men in uniform.‖30  
Also, the United States already planned to supply over 12,000 tanks and combat vehicles, 3,725 
                                               
24 Condit, History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense Volume II: The Test of War 1950-1953, 340. 
25 Eisenhower to Truman, 16 Dec 1950, p. 3-4.  Emphasis in the original. 
26 Condit, History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense Volume II: The Test of War 1950-1953, 369. 
27 Ibid., 312. 
28 Ibid., 340-1. 
29 Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement 1945-1963 (New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999), 100. 
30 Conversation between Eisenhower and Belgian Prime Minister, 10 January 1951, DDEL, DDE Papers, 
Pre-Presidential 1916-52, Box 201, SHAPE #1 Round Robin (Conversation Vol I). 
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aircraft, and 13,100 artillery pieces to NATO allies under the Mutual Defense Assistance 
Program (MDAP).
31
  But, Eisenhower pointed out, ―both are very expensive‖ and ―we are 
paying extremely high taxes‖ trying to pay for them.32  The United States could not fund the 
entirety of European defense, and the only way NATO could succeed was ―if each of the 12 
nations was ready to make sacrifices and to stand together.‖33   
The United States needed a strong NATO alliance to establish a viable collective defense, 
so Eisenhower faced the challenge of unifying all of the allied countries toward a common goal.  
A prerequisite for the European allies in building any substantial military force was a greater 
sense of unity.  In a letter to Averell Harriman, Special Assistant on Foreign Affairs to President 
Truman, on 2 April 1951, Eisenhower recalled from his prior coalition experience in Europe that 
―each [European nation] should be regarded as an equal partner…but it is certain that their 
performance will be effective only if each feels an urgent requirement to do the best that is 
possible.‖34  Yet the lack of progress toward this unity shocked Eisenhower.  In the same letter to 
Harriman, Eisenhower wrote, ―I came to Europe laboring under a misunderstanding, in that I 
thought much had already been accomplished in the way of over-all agreement concerning 
numerous details of collective administration.‖35  Especially frustrating to Eisenhower was his 
impression that ―the idea of urgency seems to be completely refuted‖ among some of the allies.36  
Eisenhower viewed himself as SACEUR as only ―one-twelfth American,‖ and he regarded many 
of the petty disagreements among the allies as unwanted distractions from the common effort.
37
  
For example, the French government voted forty-five to fifteen against delegating a piece of 
government land for the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) buildings 
because ―there was no need to allocate ground for the use of American officers.‖38   
                                               
31 Stanley L. Scott, ―The Military Aid Program,‖ Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science, 278 (Nov. 1951); 53. 
32 Conversation between Eisenhower and Belgian Prime Minister, 10 January 1951; see also Conversation 
between Eisenhower and Belgian Defense Minister, 10 January 1951, DDEL, DDE Papers, Pre-Presidential 1916-
52, Box 201, SHAPE #1 Round Robin (Conversation Vol I). 
33 Conversation between Eisenhower and Belgian Prime Minister, 10 January 1951.  
34 Letter from Eisenhower to Averell Harriman, 12 December 1950, DDEL, DDE Papers, Pre-Presidential 
1916-52, Box 55, Harriman File #5. 
35 Letter from Eisenhower to Averell Harriman, 2 April 1951, DDEL, DDE Papers, Pre-Presidential 1916-
52, Box 55, Harriman File #4. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Colonel Robert J. Wood, ―The First Year of SHAPE,‖ International Organization 6.2 (May 1952), 175. 
38
 Ibid. Emphasis in the original. 
 11 
 
Yet West Germany posed the biggest obstacle to European unity facing Eisenhower.
39
 By 
early 1950, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had come to believe that a viable defense of Europe required 
the participation of still-occupied West Germany.
40
  When he first arrived in Europe, however, 
Eisenhower was extremely reluctant to discuss the idea.  In fact, when the French Prime Minister 
in their January 1951 meeting directly asked what his view was on Germany, General 
Eisenhower refused to discuss this issue.
41
  In a letter to George C. Marshall, then serving as 
Secretary of Defense, Eisenhower stated that he initially refused to organize any ―European 
Army‖ because it seemed ―to include every kind of obstacle, difficulty, and fantastic notion that 
misguided humans could put together in one package.‖42  Eisenhower thought the issue of West 
German rearmament was so divisive that it was better to focus on other things until he had more 
firmly established himself as SACEUR.   
By August, however, Eisenhower‘s position had changed.  After working tirelessly to 
unify the NATO allies under a single banner, Eisenhower told Secretary Marshall in the same 
letter that ―the [European Army] plan offers the only immediate hope that I can see of 
developing, on a basis acceptable to other European countries, the German strength that is vital 
to us.‖43  As SHAPE solidified, Eisenhower recognized that an adequate defense of Western 
Europe was impossible without resolving the German question.  The general explained his 
newfound views on Germany during a March 1952 dinner conversation with French General 
Chaban-Delmas, French Deputy and Mayor of Bordeaux: ―Western Europe [needs] a defense 
line as far to the east in Germany as possible to give the necessary depth.  It would be 
unthinkable to have Germans defended by allied forces with the Germans sitting calmly on their 
hands and doing nothing.‖44     
Eisenhower was cognizant of other issues with Germany besides NATO‘s defense line.  
He understood the complications for NATO if West Germany either rearmed independently or 
                                               
39 At this point in time, West Germany remained an occupied country and did not exercise full national 
sovereignty.  See Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, 103, 110. 
40 Condit, History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense Volume II: The Test of War 1950-1953, 317. 
41 Conversation between Eisenhower with Rene Pleven (French Prime Minister), 24 January 1951, DDEL, 
DDE Papers, Pre-Presidential 1916-52, Box 201, SHAPE #1 Round Robin (Conversation Vol I). 
42 Letter from Eisenhower to George C. Marshall, 03 August 1951, DDEL, DDE Papers, Pre-Presidential 
1916-52, Box 80, Marshall File #1. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Memorandum of Conversation between Eisenhower and General Chaban-Delmas, 20 March 1952, 
DDEL, DDE Papers, Pre-Presidential 1916-52, Box 136, Memos of Conversations (SHAPE) File.  
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aligned itself with the Soviet Union.  In the same dinner conversation Eisenhower related, ―It [is] 
unthinkable to let Germany rearm independently…the Germans might be disposed to play the 
Soviet Union off the West or…make some sort of alliance with the Soviet Union for tactical 
purposes….If this should ever occur, the defense posture of Western Europe…would be very 
difficult, to say the least.‖45  Given the alternatives and their consequences, Eisenhower was 
convinced that, despite the difficulties, West Germany needed rearmament in a way that ―would 
tie Germany solidly and effectively in with the Western world.‖46  Thus, despite the inherent 
difficulties surrounding this issue, Eisenhower pushed for the resolution of West Germany‘s 
political status and the details of its conventional rearmament as a means to secure the unity of 
NATO.    
Eisenhower found that much of the resistance to a West German rearmament program 
came from the French.  Following eighty years of major conflicts with Germany dating back to 
the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71, the French had an almost pathological fear of a militarized 
German state.  The French government had harbored suspicions that Germany ―would eventually 
side with the Soviets as the most powerful force in Europe.‖47  In the French mind, this 
development was entirely plausible in the same vein as the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Non-
Aggression Pact between Germany and the Soviet Union.
48
  Further increasing French fears was 
the worry that American and British support for NATO would not last, leaving France to face a 
rearmed Germany on its own.  Great Britain had already shown some reluctance to become 
deeply entrenched on the continent, and the small number of troops the United States initially 
dispatched to the continent called into question American resolve to support long-term Western 
European security.
49
 
The French, along with the other NATO allies, were also highly conscious of the Soviet 
reaction.  Since NATO had been established, Soviet unease about Western Europe had steadily 
increased.  The government in Moscow was particularly wary of any attempts to create a revived 
Germany.  At an October 1950 meeting of the Eastern European foreign ministers, the Soviets 
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demanded a NATO agreement not to rearm Germany.
50
  When the NATO Defense Committee 
meetings continued in earnest to secure a plan for West German rearmament, the Soviets went a 
step further.  In November 1950, Soviet ambassadors sent notes to each of the three occupying 
powers in West Germany (Great Britain, France, and the United States) stating, ―[M]easures to 
revive the German army in West Germany would not be tolerated.‖ 51  The Soviet government 
also called for a meeting to complete the 1945 Potsdam Agreement to demilitarize Germany.
52
  
Regardless of this hesitation, Eisenhower managed, with the full support of Truman, to 
put enough pressure on France to make some tentative progress on the German question.  One of 
the last major conferences that occurred during Eisenhower‘s tenure as SACEUR was in 
February 1952 in Lisbon, Portugal.  During the Lisbon Conference, the NATO allies endorsed 
the concept of the European Defense Community (EDC).
53
  Placed on the negotiating table by 
the French, the proposed EDC Treaty called for the establishment of a European Defense Force 
composed of all nations under the command of the NATO Supreme Commander.  This Defense 
Force would act on a supra-national level, wearing a common uniform and having the same 
equipment no matter what the nationality of the individual units.
54
  The EDC concept was not 
very different from the ―European Army‖ idea Eisenhower had been advocating (although he 
had earlier opposed it).  The French government believed the EDC provided for an adequate 
compromise between U.S. pressure to integrate West Germany and its own fears of an 
independent and rearmed German nation.  Under the EDC, West Germany could not re-create a 
separate national army or general staff and had limits on the number of troops it could equip.
55
  
While Eisenhower himself had his doubts about the military effectiveness of the EDC, 
Eisenhower thought the only way to achieve greater unity of the NATO Alliance was through 
collaborative organizations such as the EDC.  Eisenhower believed that military cohesion among 
the allies would pave the way for later political unification.
56
  The United States and the other 
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allies signed a contractual agreement extending NATO defense commitments to the planned 
EDC in May 1952, thus in principle integrating Germany into Western Europe‘s collective 
security without making it an equal member of NATO.
57
 
While this was undoubtedly an important step toward greater European unity, the 
contractual agreements of May 1952 were contingent upon the ratification of the EDC Treaty by 
the member nations.
58
  In several of the NATO countries, however, significant internal 
opposition to the EDC existed.  Some French officials warned that the majority of the French 
National Assembly did not support the EDC.  René Pleven, French Prime Minister and strong 
supporter of European integration, had rushed the EDC Treaty to the table without consulting 
either the French military authorities or the Foreign Ministry.
59
  The Socialist Party in the French 
National Assembly worried that the EDC threatened national sovereignty and did not do enough 
to curb their fears over Germany.
60
  There was also concern that the heavy commitment of 
French forces to Indochina would leave France stretched too thin to oppose a German army 
concentrated in central Europe.
61
   
West German politicians did not view the EDC favorably either, believing it imposed too 
many restrictions solely on their nation.  Konrad Adenauer, the West German chancellor, entered 
into the EDC negotiations dedicated to the principle of ―equality of rights.‖62  The West Germans 
agreed to enter into any integration plan as long as any controls of armaments applied equally to 
all EDC members (such as forced troop-level restrictions or limits on arms manufacturing), but 
as negotiations progressed it appeared the Germany would be more heavily restricted than the 
other nations.
63
  Adenauer also remained uneasy with the EDC-NATO relationship.  When 
proposing the EDC concept, France had included a provision calling for simultaneous 
declarations from both the EDC and NATO that an attack on one meant an attack on the other.
64
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The problem for Adenauer, however, was that West Germany was not a member of NATO.  In 
effect, a situation could arise where NATO could make decisions affecting the EDC without 
Germany having any representation to voice concerns or objections.
65
  While Adenauer wanted 
Germany more integrated into the Western alliance, to him the EDC Treaty represented a flawed 
solution and required further negotiation.  
Serious doubts remained in Great Britain also.  Initially, the British Parliament favored 
the idea of a ―European‖ system independent of the American-dominated NATO alliance that 
could provide a ―third force‖ balance to both the United States and the Soviet Union.66  Upon 
analyzing the provisions of the planned EDC, however, the British realized that Western Europe 
would not be strong enough to stand on its own without American support and leadership.
67
  An 
EDC independent of the U.S. would prove disastrous because while French plans called for a 
supra-national European army, no supra-national political structure accompanied it.  Only the 
post of SACEUR in NATO could provide the requisite leadership.
68
  Because of this dynamic, 
the British looked to downplay the EDC in favor of the existing NATO structure to keep the 
United States closely linked to its trans-Atlantic neighbors.
69
   
Thus, while the Western allies had made their first steps towards a greater sense of 
cohesion, the journey towards lasting unity in Europe was far from over.  If the EDC Treaty 
came to a standstill during debates in the allied capitals, Eisenhower would have to start from 
scratch to create a new compromise agreeable to all the NATO participants.  Even if ratified, the 
EDC and its European Army would take many months to organize.  Eisenhower had yet to 
realize Truman‘s ultimate goal of forging a Western Europe that could stand on its own, but he 
viewed the EDC as a viable solution to easing the tensions among the Western European allies. 
As he worked to solve the problems of NATO, Eisenhower faced a different type of 
pressure from within the United States: the pressure of the mainstream political parties.  As far 
back as 1948, Eisenhower had faced pressure from both the Republican and Democratic Parties 
to run as a candidate.  In 1952, given his fame and reputation among the American people, both 
parties accepted that Eisenhower represented the best hope to secure victory in the upcoming 
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presidential election.
70
  Despite his own sharp political intellect, however, Eisenhower told 
prominent visitors to SHAPE in the last half of 1951 that, ―I do not want to be president of the 
United States and I want no other political office or political connection of any kind.‖71  
Furthermore, he explained that any partisan political activity was incompatible with his current 
responsibilities as supreme commander of NATO.
72
 
By the beginning of 1952, however, Eisenhower had begun to shift his position.  Instead 
of viewing it as a hindrance to his current duties, Eisenhower envisioned political office as an 
extension of his original oath as a soldier to serve the country.  As Pach and Richardson explain 
in The Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower, Eisenhower‘s admirers and associates persuaded 
the general that the American people were ―genuinely calling him to a higher, political 
service.‖73  After Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., one of the most powerful figures in the GOP, 
announced that he was entering Eisenhower‘s name in the New Hampshire primary, Eisenhower 
decided to act.  In January 1952, he released a statement indicating he would leave the post of 
SACEUR if ―called to a more important service, such as accepting the Republican nomination 
for president.‖74 
Eisenhower still needed to secure the terms of his release from active duty with President 
Truman.  In a letter dated 2 April 1952, General Eisenhower wrote the president to request that 
the Secretary of Defense release him from his current post in the next sixty days.
75
  In the letter, 
while he acknowledged that ―by June the work of SHAPE will not be finished,‖ Eisenhower 
detailed for Truman that he could not ―ignore the influence of a number of American political 
incidents of the past winter.‖76  Accordingly, Eisenhower believed that circumstances forced him 
to ―seek early termination of my military assignment so that any political activity centering about 
me cannot possibly affect the military service.‖77  President Truman granted the request, and in 
                                               
70 Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier and President , 239; Pach and  Richardson, 1. 
71 Pach and Richardson, The Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1. 
72 Ibid., 19. 
73 Ibid., 2. 
74 Ibid., 20. 
75 Letter from Eisenhower to President Harry Truman, 2 April 1952, DDEL, DDE Papers, Pre-Presidential 
1916-52, Box 116, Truman File #1. 
76 Ibid. 
77
 Ibid. 
 17 
 
June Eisenhower officially relinquished the post of NATO Supreme Commander to campaign for 
the presidency.
78
 
 As he returned home an American hero, General Eisenhower had clearly left a lasting 
legacy on the still fledgling NATO Alliance.  The general‘s efforts over the year and a half of his 
command provided the groundwork for the continued expansion of collective security in Western 
Europe.  In his letter of resignation to President Truman, Eisenhower himself observed that ―the 
special organizational and initial planning missions that were deemed critical in the late weeks of 
1950 have now been accomplished…. [P]rogress will … follow the lines that have … been 
marked out.‖79  When Eisenhower stepped down in mid-1952, the Western Alliance was slowly 
but surely forming a strong counterweight to Soviet power in the Eastern Europe.   
More importantly, Eisenhower‘s efforts to enact Truman‘s European policy allowed him 
to draw two main conclusions about a viable Cold War strategy.  First, Eisenhower, drawing 
upon his previous experience with a large European coalition, went to NATO in early 1951 in 
complete agreement with President Truman‘s assumption that it was cheaper for the United 
States to arm its allies than to shoulder the burden of collective security by itself.
80
  Judging by 
his statements to Truman as he left SHAPE, Eisenhower‘s service at NATO only strengthened 
his conviction.  It stands to reason that, if his experience as SACEUR had been a largely negative 
experience, Eisenhower would have said as much to Truman.  Also, as detailed in the next 
chapter, if Eisenhower left Europe believing the NATO concept was faulty, he would not have 
made it a major piece of his own defense policy.   
Second, Eisenhower left Europe as a supporter of the EDC.  He thought, given the 
complexities of the interactions between the European allies, that the only way to achieve greater 
unity in NATO was through the realization of the ―European Army‖ concept.  Although the 
success or failure of the EDC Treaty was yet to be decided, in Eisenhower‘s mind it was 
necessary for the United States to support the ratification of the EDC Treaty.  As Marc 
Trachtenberg concluded in A Constructed Peace, ―the Eisenhower administration had its heart 
set on the EDC.‖81   
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As he moved from NATO Headquarters to the Oval Office, Eisenhower took these 
convictions with him.  Eisenhower believed that President Truman had been correct in his 
―Europe First‖ policy and that the American effort to unify NATO had borne fruit in the form of 
the EDC Treaty.  Consequently, as detailed in the next two chapters, because of his experiences 
as SACEUR, Eisenhower made the U.S. commitment to NATO and the ratification of the EDC 
Treaty key points of his own defense policy as president.        
 19 
 
CHAPTER 2 - Building the “New Look” Strategy, 1953 
After assuming the presidency in January 1953, crafting a national defense policy was at 
the forefront of Eisenhower‘s mind.  The new president, along with his national security staff, 
began working toward a defense policy that focused on three main concepts: maintaining a sound 
American economy, continuing to strengthen the NATO alliance, and delineating a clear policy 
on the use of nuclear weapons.  After less than a year in office, Eisenhower approved the ―New 
Look‖ policy described by his National Security Council advisers in NSC document 162/2 on 30 
October 1953.  While working with his NSC staff to craft this policy (including officials from 
the State, Defense, and Treasury Departments along with his Cabinet), Eisenhower‘s experiences 
at NATO reinforced his economic thinking on the importance of foreign troops and reliance on 
nuclear weapons as part of the ―New Look.‖ 
Despite its catchy moniker, the policy delineated in NSC-162/2 was not a radical break 
from the defense policy set by Truman.  Indeed, Eisenhower did not fundamentally change 
Truman‘s defense framework.  As Donald Mrozek, a distinguished professor at Kansas State 
University and long-time Eisenhower Era historian, argued in his 1974 article ―A New Look at 
‗Balanced Forces‘: Defense Continuities from Truman to Eisenhower,‖ ―The strategic 
framework that Eisenhower accepted with the start of his Administration was that of the Truman 
defense system.‖82  John Gaddis also asserted in Strategies of Containment that ―Eisenhower had 
supported each of the [Truman] administration‘s major diplomatic and strategic initiatives.‖83 
These arguments ring especially true when analyzing the continuity between Truman and 
Eisenhower regarding two major aspects of the ―New Look‖: the NATO alliance and nuclear 
weapons.  As explained later in this chapter, Eisenhower was in complete agreement with 
Truman on the importance of the NATO alliance as well as the necessity of getting the Western 
European allies to contribute to their own defense.  Accordingly, Eisenhower‘s NSC staff 
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integrated into NSC-162/2 the explicit statement that, ―The United States cannot…meet its 
defense needs, even at exorbitant cost, without support of the allies.‖84   
Concerning nuclear weapons, Truman‘s paradigm was that America‘s strategic bombers 
provided a deterrent against Soviet aggression not just against the United States but also against 
Western Europe.
85
  While acting as the temporary presiding officer of the Joint Chiefs in 1949, 
Eisenhower had agreed with this assertion, and he continued to do so during his own 
presidency.
86
  As declared in NSC-162/2, ―The major deterrent to aggression against Western 
Europe is the manifest determination of the United States to use its atomic capability and 
massive retaliatory striking power if the area is attacked.‖87  Eisenhower continued funneling 
monies to the expansion of the American nuclear stockpile just as Truman had been doing since 
1950.
88
 
Thus, Eisenhower‘s views on national defense while acting as SACEUR and later as 
president present a historical continuum suggesting that his experiences at NATO did not cause 
him to break with the policies started by Truman.  Instead, Eisenhower‘s service as NATO 
Supreme Commander reinforced his belief that Truman was pursuing a faulty execution of these 
policies with the adoption of the strategy detailed in NSC-68.  As Mrozek concluded, 
Eisenhower thought Truman‘s error had been ―mismanagement, not misconception.‖89   
NSC-68, the national security document detailing the U.S. defense strategy adopted by 
Truman in September 1950, explained that its base assumption was that by 1954 ―the Soviet will 
possess the military capability of delivering a surprise attack,‖ and, in response, ―the United 
States must have substantially increased air, ground, and sea strength, atomic capabilities…to 
deter war.‖90  To achieve such an expansion without radically increasing budget deficits or 
lowering the domestic standard of living, the authors of NSC-68 (an ad-hoc committee of 
officials from the State and Defense Departments) proposed that government spending in war-
related industries would expand the size of the economy and thereby absorb the increase in 
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defense expenditures without long-term harm to the health of the U.S. economy.
91
  As the 
authors pointed out in NSC-68, ―One of the most significant lessons of our World War II 
experience was that the American economy, when it operates at a level approaching full 
efficiency, can provide enormous resources for purposes other than civilian consumption while 
simultaneously providing a higher standard of living.‖92  NSC-68, along with further arguments 
from Leon Keyserling, a prominent economist who espoused the Keynesian economic expansion 
theory similar to that found in NSC-68, convinced Truman to change his approach to defense 
spending and force structure.
93
  Prior to the Korean War, Truman had set a maximum cap on the 
defense budget at approximately $15 billion, a measure with which Eisenhower whole-heartedly 
agreed.
94
  After approving NSC-68 and its underlying assumptions on the economy and the 
nature of an immediate Soviet threat, however, Truman increased the defense budget to a sum of 
nearly $48 billion for Fiscal Year (FY) 1951, with approximately $210 billion in future 
expenditures through FY 1954.
95
  A major part of this expansion in defense spending went 
toward a huge increase in the conventional U.S. military force structure from 1.5 million 
personnel in 1950 to 3.3 million by 1954.
96
     
Eisenhower objected to Truman‘s adoption of NSC-68 and its related force structure 
because he did not believe in their underlying premise of the Soviets presenting an immediate 
threat.  Writing in his journal in January 1952, Eisenhower related his belief that ―There is no 
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greater probability of war [with the Soviet Union] today than there was two years ago; and no 
one can say for certain that there is any greater probability of deliberately provoked war at the 
end of this year or of the next than there is now.‖97  Because he did not foresee an immediate 
threat of war, Eisenhower rejected the idea that ―we must build up to a maximum attainable 
strength for some specific date theoretically fixed for a specific time in the future.‖98  
Eisenhower also thought that the United States should subject itself to the budget deficits 
possible under the expanded Truman budgets of FYs 1951-1954 only in the ―immediate 
prospects of war.‖99  Because he believed Truman meant to continue this higher level of 
spending ―indefinitely into the future,‖ Eisenhower assumed the United States would suffer from 
―unconscionable inflation‖ that would ruin the national economy.100  According to Robert 
Collins in More: The Politics of Economic Growth in Postwar America, Eisenhower believed 
that economic growth revolved around price stability, and that inflation would disrupt the 
economic business cycle through price fluctuations.
101
 Consequently, Eisenhower entered the 
White House intent on modifying the military force structure and spending program outlined in 
NSC-68 in the hopes of achieving a balanced budget.
102
  As recorded at a February 1953 meeting 
of the NSC, Eisenhower believed there was ―a growing complacency in this country which 
appeared to believe that the United States could go on spending as it pleased without regard for 
its income.‖103   
                                               
97 Eisenhower, ―Diary Entry, 22 January 1952,‖ The Eisenhower Diaries, 213.   
98 U.S. National Archives, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 1953 (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1960), 242. 
99 Eisenhower, ―Diary Entry, 22 January 1952,‖ 212. 
100 Ibid., 213.   
101 Collins, More: The Politics of Economic Growth in Postwar America, 43. 
102 The issue of inflation and government spending is also part of larger debate in the 1950s over two 
economic approaches.  The economic paradigm advocated by Edwin Nourse, one of Truman‘s primary economic 
advisers in the late 1940s, argued that there was a choice between a sound economy or ―wasteful‖ expenses on the 
military, and budgets had to be balanced to maintain a strong economy.  The economic theory advocated by Leon 
Keyserling, on the other hand, followed the ideas of John Maynard Keynes and explained that increased government 
spending could stimulate dynamic economic growth.  Eisenhower appears to have agreed more with Nourse‘s 
version by his desire to maintain a balanced budget as president.  See Lester H. Brune, ―Guns and Butter: The Pre-
Korean War Dispute over Budget Allocations: Nourse‘s Conservative Keynesianism Loses Favor against 
Keyserling‘s Economic Expansion Plan,‖ American Journal of Economics and Sociology 48 (July 1989); 368; 
Collins, More: The Politics of Economic Growth in Postwar America, 22-4, 37-8; John Gaddis, Strategies of 
Containment, 134-5. 
103 Staff Secretary notes of the 132nd NSC Meeting, p. 8, 18 February 1953, DDEL (Ann Whitman File 
[AWF]), NSC Series, Box 4, ―132nd NSC Meeting, 18 Feb 1953.‖ 
 23 
 
In particular, Eisenhower disagreed with the provision in NSC-68 that called for a rapid 
expansion of conventional U.S. military forces.  Eisenhower knew from his service as Army 
Chief of Staff during the post-World War II demobilization that the number of military 
personnel, above anything else, was the most expensive factor in defense spending.
104
  Cutting 
the number of U.S. military personnel could result in substantial savings. 
The strength of Eisenhower‘s conviction on the economic benefits of reducing American 
personnel levels is evidenced by comments he made throughout high-level discussions on the 
―New Look‖ policy.  In February 1953, Eisenhower told the NSC that, ―if we could actually get 
the European defense plan and European armies into being, it would cost less than a fifth of the 
price it would require…to do it ourselves.‖105  The next month, Eisenhower told the Joint Chiefs 
that ―the cost of maintaining an American soldier in the field is fantastically higher than the cost 
of maintaining a foreign soldier … [It is] far cheaper to provide assistance to create and maintain 
foreign divisions … than to go ahead so rapidly in the development of additional U.S. 
divisions.‖106  Eisenhower clearly recognized and pursued the economic benefits of maintaining 
a smaller U.S. military than the one envisioned under NSC-68. 
As important as the economic argument was in Eisenhower‘s mindset, primary evidence 
indicates that another factor strengthened Eisenhower‘s thinking regarding the size of the 
American military: his experience at NATO Headquarters.  Eisenhower‘s time as SACEUR had 
shown him that the United States did not need a large conventional force of its own to ensure its 
national security.  While acting as SACEUR, one of the main premises Eisenhower advocated 
was the necessity of the European allies pulling their own weight regarding NATO defense 
spending (in accordance with the guidelines set by Truman).  Eisenhower continually stressed to 
the NATO Allies that the United States ―could not … go to every spot in the world where our 
enemies may use force … and defend those nations.‖107 
While progress towards this goal was slow, Eisenhower‘s firsthand experience in NATO 
had shown him that the Western European allies had made considerable gains toward providing 
for their own defense.  In January 1952, Eisenhower wrote in his diary, ―Europe is much closer 
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than ever before to establishing…safety and prosperity.‖108  Furthermore, although the EDC and 
its accompanying ―European Army‖ was far from complete, Eisenhower told Truman in his 
letter of resignation from SHAPE that the NATO signatories had accomplished ―a marked 
degree of success in the task of building a viable defense structure.‖109  In fact, by November 
1951, the NATO conventional force had risen to thirty-five divisions (including six U.S. 
divisions but no German units) and almost 3,000 aircraft.
110
   
It is possible that Eisenhower‘s observations on the growing strength of NATO 
contributed to his skepticism of the need for a large U.S. conventional force.  With the growing 
strength of the NATO conventional forces (which as of yet did not incorporate a planned twelve 
German divisions
111
), the United States had no need to increase its own troop levels in Europe.  
However, because Eisenhower did not discuss this aspect in his statements on the ―New Look,‖ 
there can be no definitive conclusion on this point.   
What is clear from the available primary evidence is that Eisenhower‘s aversion to an 
expansion of the conventional U.S. military connected to NATO‘s defense for another reason: a 
larger U.S. military would increase the tendency for the NATO Allies to absolve themselves of 
their commitments to the collective security of Western Europe.  This issue had worried 
Eisenhower since accepting the nomination to become SACEUR.  Writing to W. Averell 
Harriman on 12 December 1950, Eisenhower remarked, ―It is only human nature to try to throw 
responsibility upon others‖ and that in the same vein the Western European allies could ―feel the 
United States [was] responsible for them … [and] will tend to relieve themselves‖ of 
responsibility for NATO.
112
  Eisenhower said much the same in a letter dated 16 December, 
stating his belief that the American commitment to Europe, if not handled correctly, ―might 
create an even greater European tendency to sit back and wait in a renewed confidence that the 
United States has assumed an inescapable and publicly stated responsibility.‖113  Eisenhower 
recognized at the outset of his term as NATO Supreme Commander that the United States had to 
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walk a fine line between showing its full support for NATO and preventing the Europeans from 
becoming completely reliant on the presence of U.S. divisions in Western Europe.  The 
Europeans had to provide the great bulk of ground forces needed.
114
  As Eisenhower later 
commented to the NSC, ―the stationing of U.S. divisions in Europe had been at the outset an 
emergency measure not intended to last indefinitely.‖115      
Throughout his time at SHAPE, Eisenhower was always conscious of this balancing act.  
In a letter to George C. Marshall in August 1951, Eisenhower related his belief that ―we must 
show every nation that it is serving its own interests when it places NATO matters in top 
priority.‖116  Eisenhower continued by stating that he had given every effort to ―securing fervent 
European adherence to the essentials of the NATO concept,‖ but that ―throughout West Europe, 
there is needed greater understanding, greater fervor, greater faith.‖117  The danger was always 
present that the NATO signatories would become too dependent on the United States, and, for 
Eisenhower, maintaining this balance was his never-ending task as SACEUR.   
Eisenhower‘s comments during the debates over the ―New Look‖ illustrate that European 
perceptions of American conventional strength continued to prey on his mind.  As president, 
Eisenhower apparently thought an expansion of the U.S. conventional military would send the 
wrong message to the Western Allies; his observations as SACEUR had shown him that the 
Allies were adopting the attitude he had feared since late 1950.  Eisenhower lamented in October 
1953, ―Unhappily, the European nations have been slow in building their own military forces and 
had now come to expect our forces to remain in Europe indefinitely.‖118 Eisenhower was so 
convinced of this fact that he explained to the NSC his belief that the public announcement of 
even a small reduction of the U.S. ground force in Europe would ―completely destroy‖ the 
progress made thus far.
119
  Thus, Eisenhower‘s experiences as SACEUR demonstrated to him 
that building a large U.S. conventional capability would likely exacerbate the hands-off feeling 
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in NATO as the signatory nations had domestic reasons for wanting reductions in their own 
conventional defense pledges.
120
    
As a result of these concerns, the approved NSC-162/2 emphasized the continued build-
up of Allied conventional forces over that of the United States.  NSC-162/2 insisted that, while 
existing under the umbrella of U.S. strategic nuclear deterrence, ―the ground forces required to 
counter local aggressions must be supplied largely by our allies.‖121  While much progress had 
been made ―especially since 1950 to build up the strength, cohesion, and common determination 
of the free world,‖ it was an absolute necessity that Western European states continue to ―build 
and maintain maximum feasible defensive strength.‖122  The collective defense of NATO relied 
on Allied conventional forces rather than an increased U.S. presence.   
While Eisenhower‘s experiences at NATO undoubtedly influenced his view on the 
necessity of a large conventional force, the origins of Eisenhower‘s thinking on nuclear weapons 
are harder to define.  As explained earlier, Eisenhower‘s opinion that Europe could be protected 
with U.S-based strategic nuclear bombers had remained constant since 1949.  The real change in 
Eisenhower‘s thinking was that, under the ―New Look‖ policy, nuclear weapons were necessary 
to deter both conventional and nuclear aggression by the Soviet Union.
123
  As David Alan 
Rosenberg argues in ―The Origins of Overkill,‖ his article delineating the development of 
American nuclear policy 1945-1960, a large element of Eisenhower‘s nuclear strategy was 
―defense against local aggression, especially in Western Europe.‖124  Rosenberg also asserts that, 
for the first time in U.S. defense policy, the ―New Look‖ defense program identified the 
provision of tactical atomic support for United States or allied military forces.
125
   
As with the issue of conventional forces, Eisenhower made statements demonstrating he 
recognized the clear economic benefits of relying on nuclear weapons, especially tactical 
warheads.  In November 1953, Eisenhower wrote that ―the dependence that we are placing on 
new [atomic] weapons would justify completely some reduction in conventional forces.‖126  
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Eisenhower saw that an increased reliance on nuclear weapons further reduced the need for a 
large conventional force because the weapons would further deter Soviet aggression against 
NATO. 
Additionally, Eisenhower received copious advice on the advantages of tactical nuclear 
weapons that may have shaped his thinking.  John Foster Dulles, Eisenhower‘s Secretary of 
State, wrote a memorandum to the president in the fall of 1953 on the subject of nuclear 
weapons.  Recognizing the ―difficult task of building up adequate forces to counter the threat of 
Soviet aggression … [with] limitations imposed by the economy and manpower of the United 
States, as well as of our allies,‖ Dulles argued that the U.S. military had ―reached a stage where 
the number, diversity, and power of atomic weapons, together with their application to tactical 
situations, make necessary the adoption of a general policy for their use in the event of 
hostilities.‖127 Dulles, as one of Eisenhower‘s most trusted advisers, undoubtedly had an 
important impact on the president‘s decision-making regarding nuclear weapons.128  
Furthermore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff told Eisenhower their belief that the new tactical atomic 
weapons would be needed just to ―prevent the overrunning of a large portion of Europe in the 
opening phases of a war.‖129  This advice could have shaped Eisenhower‘s thinking regarding the 
potential use of tactical nuclear weapons or merely reinforced his own thoughts.    
Yet the origins of Eisenhower‘s thinking on nuclear weapons may have formed during 
the eighteen-month period he had acted as the top military commander for NATO.  In this 
capacity, Eisenhower was at the very least aware of the military possibilities regarding tactical 
nuclear weapons.  In December 1951, Eisenhower received a briefing on the conclusions of the 
Project VISTA study group, a September 1950 Defense Department study conducted by the 
California Institute of Technology on the possible employment of tactical nuclear weapons.
130
  
To correct the serious imbalances in numbers of military personnel and aircraft between NATO 
and the Soviet Union, the Cal Tech scientists assigned to Project VISTA group estimated that as 
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few as 100 small atomic bombs could tip the scale in favor of the NATO allies.
131
  The VISTA 
group also forcefully argued that the efficient and successful use of atomic weapons might well 
be ―the decisive factor in the defense of Europe.‖132  Additionally, in January 1952 the Joint 
Chiefs authorized the first planning exercises that included nuclear weapons.
133
  It is reasonable 
to assume that Eisenhower‘s assessment of the military situation in Europe affected his thinking 
on the utility of tactical nuclear weapons.   
Strangely, however, Eisenhower left behind no evidence to this effect.  He appears to 
have never used his own military assessment of tactical nuclear weapons when discussing the 
―New Look.‖  While it seems unreasonable to think that his own military perspectives on tactical 
nuclear weapons were not on his mind, a lack of direct evidence prevents any definitive 
conclusion.  
In the discussions leading to NSC-162/2, it is clear that Eisenhower‘s economic beliefs 
played a prominent role.  Because of his disagreements with some of the base assumptions in 
NSC-68 concerning the economy and the Soviet threat, Eisenhower questioned some aspects of 
Truman‘s approach to waging the Cold War.  Eisenhower thought the policy outlined in NSC-68, 
especially its provision for a large American conventional force, was faulty execution of 
Truman‘s strategy because of its assumed economic repercussions (namely Eisenhower‘s belief 
that deficit spending would spark high inflation).  Based on these preconceptions, Eisenhower 
explained time and again that supporting NATO and relying on nuclear weapons would save the 
United States money and bring it closer to a balanced budget. 
Eisenhower‘s experience at SHAPE served to reinforce this economic perspective.  As 
SACEUR, Eisenhower had witnessed the expansion of NATO‘s conventional capabilities.  
Eisenhower‘s experience also made him highly sensitive to European attitudes towards the 
American commitment to Western Europe.  Rather than building a large American conventional 
force, which he believed might send the wrong message to the Europeans, Eisenhower insisted 
that the United States should focus on supporting the NATO countries in their efforts to increase 
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their own conventional strength.  Therefore, Eisenhower‘s experience reinforced his economic 
stance regarding the necessity of having smaller conventional U.S. military forces. 
Regarding nuclear weapons, although evidence is tenuous at best, it is reasonable to infer 
that Eisenhower‘s experiences dealing with tactical nuclear weapons as SACEUR affected his 
thinking as president.  The evidence definitely indicates that Eisenhower dealt with the issue of 
tactical nuclear weapons as SACEUR, and, as Rosenberg points out, tactical nuclear weapons 
were a part of the ―New Look‖ policy.  There is not enough evidence, however, to assess 
accurately the degree to which Eisenhower‘s service played a part in his approach to tactical 
nuclear weapons in the ―New Look.‖ 
As described in this chapter, Eisenhower made supporting NATO a major piece of his 
defense policy.  This emphasis on NATO involved securing the greater unity of the Western 
European nations.  For Eisenhower, greater unity had to come in the form of the European 
Defense Community.  As he moved forward to implement the ―New Look,‖ finalizing the EDC 
became Eisenhower‘s priority.  
  
  
 30 
 
CHAPTER 3 - Implementing the “New Look” in Western 
Europe, 1954 
As detailed in the previous chapter, Eisenhower‘s experiences as SACEUR reinforced his 
economic assumptions underlying the ―New Look.‖  Yet the influence of Eisenhower‘s time as 
NATO Supreme Commander did not end with the approval of NSC-162/2 in October 1953.  
With emphasis on strengthening the NATO coalition and a greater reliance on nuclear weapons 
to deter local aggression as major pieces of the ―New Look,‖ Eisenhower‘s experiences as 
SACEUR determined how he implemented these two elements of his defense policy for Western 
Europe.  For Eisenhower, experience in Europe had convinced him that strengthening the NATO 
coalition meant fully supporting the ratification of the European Defense Community (EDC) 
Treaty.  Regarding nuclear weapons, Eisenhower believed the United States needed to bring the 
NATO allies closer by allowing them access to sensitive information on the nuclear weapons 
deployed for possible use in continental Europe.    
The EDC Treaty, while initially appearing to represent a workable compromise for the 
integration of West German military resources, had quickly lost momentum during the 
ratification process.  This was unacceptable to Eisenhower, who saw the EDC‘s military 
provisions as essential to future political cooperation among the West Europeans.  Eisenhower 
thought the real point of the EDC was to weld France and Germany together as the core of a 
strong, independent European federation that could stand against the Soviets on its own, thus 
making it possible for American forces to withdraw from Europe in the near future.
134
  As 
Eisenhower was reported to have told the French Prime Minister and French Foreign Minister in 
their December 1953 meeting, ―the only practical way to insure the defense of the free world lay 
in the development of a greater unity on continental Europe by the by the association of France 
and Germany.‖135  From this perspective, the contribution of West German troops to NATO was 
not nearly as important as unifying the Allies.  Eisenhower explained as much when discussing 
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the possibility of a West German national army as opposed to the EDC: ―to resort to a national 
army [is] a choice so far behind the EDC that there could be no comparison.‖136     
Eisenhower strongly believed in the unifying effects of the EDC and its European Army.  
In fact, in January 1953, Eisenhower commented in his diary that ―until Europe makes a success 
of the European Army … we can have little confidence of its future.‖137  Additionally, as he said 
in the December 1953 meeting with French officials, Eisenhower was convinced that ―the EDC 
was not only practical and feasible, but absolutely essential to any permanent solution‖ in 
achieving ―a much greater degree of unity‖ in Europe.138  Eisenhower even went as far as saying 
that he could see ―no acceptable alternative to the EDC.‖139  Indeed, a few days later Eisenhower 
told the NSC that ―our one great objective at the moment was to secure the ratification of the 
EDC.‖140   
Eisenhower‘s conviction of the necessity of the EDC stemmed from his experience as 
SACEUR.  As early as January 1952, Eisenhower had been stressing the need for the Western 
European allies to move quickly on the agreeing to the EDC.
141
  Speaking to members of the 
Dutch Parliament, Eisenhower explained that he ―strongly believed that the EDC … would prove 
necessary for further federative steps and would thus hasten union‖ among Western European 
countries.
142
   
Eisenhower‘s thoughts on the EDC while acting as SACEUR are even more evident in 
his final conversation with Chancellor Adenauer of West Germany (which occurred on 3 May 
1952).  Speaking of the greater unity of Western Europe, Eisenhower said, ―Signature of the 
EDC … is essential as a first step toward the process of European federation.‖143  Eisenhower 
elaborated by stating that ―at the heart of the problem is the question of understanding between 
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France and Germany.‖144  Indeed, Eisenhower maintained that the ―overall and essential 
objective‖ of the EDC was ―a real Franco-German entente.‖145  
Thus, as he entered the Oval Office, Eisenhower already had the ideas in mind that he 
expressed to French officials in December 1953.  The real question was how to push the EDC 
towards complete ratification.  Support for the EDC Treaty quickly dwindled in the Western 
European capitals, particularly in France, where partisan debate over the EDC had become 
particularly heated.  Eisenhower‘s original hope had been that the NATO allies would ratify the 
EDC Treaty by the beginning of 1953, with the first six of twelve West German divisions 
scheduled to be at full strength by the end of the year.
146
  At the end of April 1953, however, 
Secretary of State Dulles reported to Eisenhower that the anticipated delay in the ratification of 
the EDC made any progress towards a Franco-German union unlikely before October.
147
  As his 
December 1953 comments demonstrate, Eisenhower was dissatisfied with the ratification delays 
in Europe. 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington were also growing impatient with the lack of 
progress.  Viewing the EDC primarily as a military solution for the defense of NATO, 
Eisenhower‘s military advisers stressed that the twelve German divisions were indispensible to 
NATO war planning, and that without them in the event of war the United States would likely 
have to forfeit all of West Germany (and perhaps even a substantial portion of France) if the 
Germans could not militarily reinforce the six American divisions stationed within their 
country.
148
  The Joint Chiefs also reminded Eisenhower that, in any case, there would be a 
substantial delay between ratification and the employment of full-strength German units.  The 
mountains of equipment slated for German units remained in the United States pending EDC 
ratification, and the shipment of these supplies to West Germany was not going to be 
instantaneous.
149
  In addition, Germany would need time to recruit, organize, and train the 
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necessary personnel.  The Joint Chiefs requested that Eisenhower set a deadline for ratification 
of the EDC Treaty, after which time the United States would pursue the unilateral rearmament of 
West Germany.
150
  
Eisenhower continued to urge patience among the Joint Chiefs because his service at 
NATO made him sensitive to problems within European countries over the EDC Treaty.  
Eisenhower was especially familiar with French concerns.  As he told Chancellor Adenauer in 
May 1952, Eisenhower ―had spent much time in … France and he thought France had come a 
long way‖ in solving its problems regarding the EDC, although France ―had serious problems 
with parliamentary and public opinion based on historical experiences with Germany.‖151  
Eisenhower reiterated his commitment to assuaging French complaints in a letter to French 
Premier Joseph Laniel in September 1953.  In this letter, Eisenhower explained that he 
recognized the difficulties in France of ratifying the EDC because he was ―not blind to history‖ 
concerning Germany and that he did not view delays as failure.
152
  For Eisenhower, France was 
the linchpin to the future security of NATO through the EDC.  On several occasions, Eisenhower 
commented that he had ―strong skepticism as to whether there was any really effective 
alternative to French membership in the EDC.‖153  Because of this consideration for France, 
Eisenhower quashed the idea of American unilateral rearmament of Germany, given the French 
government‘s ―almost hysterical fear‖ of abandonment by the United States.154  Eisenhower 
made it clear that unilateral action was not yet a plausible option for the United States, as the 
French only needed more time to resolve their internal issues and ratify the EDC Treaty. 
The disagreement between the Joint Chiefs and Eisenhower continued into the summer of 
1953.  At the NSC meeting of 13 August, the Joint Chiefs pressured Eisenhower to agree to a 1 
January 1954 deadline that they had suggested a few weeks earlier in response to their growing 
concern over the availability of the German divisions.
155
  Secretary Dulles, reflecting the 
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president‘s own view, commented that ―any arbitrary date…would be nothing less than 
catastrophic [and] destroy the possibility of realizing an integrated Europe.‖156  France was the 
lynchpin for Eisenhower, and he remained adamant that the prospect of rearming Germany 
unilaterally would do more harm than good.
157
  Ultimately, the president set a deadline of 1 April 
1954 for the ratification of the EDC Treaty, although he did not adhere to this deadline as he 
―could not see what direction‖ the United States was going to take in the event of the failure of 
the EDC.
158
   
France dragged its feet on ratification of the EDC for a variety of reasons.  The Gaullist 
Party and other nationalist groups within the National Assembly objected to relinquishing control 
of French troops to the supra-national ―European Army.‖159  Further complicating matters was 
the failing French effort in Indochina, which had fallen apart in May following the surrender of 
the French garrison at Dien Bien Phu.  When Eisenhower pledged only monetary support and not 
U.S. military forces to help stabilize the French position in Indochina, French political opinion 
swung even further against the EDC.
160
  Ultimately, a majority in the French National Assembly 
tabled the EDC Treaty without a vote on 30 August 1954.
161
 
With this action, the French government destroyed Eisenhower‘s hopes for the EDC and 
greater Western European unity.  The defeat of the EDC Treaty within the French National 
Assembly meant Eisenhower had no way to realize either the supra-national ―European Army‖ 
or the strong Franco-German alliance that he had pushed for since his days as SACEUR.  
Without this central unity among the Europeans, Eisenhower knew from experience that 
America could not withdraw its own conventional forces from NATO.  Without the stability he 
presumed to be inherent in the EDC, Eisenhower told the NSC that he ―had no slight idea of 
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reducing the number of [U.S.] forces in Europe in the next two years‖ because ―The European 
nations are not yet ready to take up the slack.‖162   
The British government, however, which had for some time been pushing for German 
rearmament, saw the demise of the EDC as an opportunity.
163
  British Foreign Secretary Anthony 
Eden called for a conference in London and Paris to discuss admitting Germany into the Western 
European Union (WEU).  Great Britain, France, and the Benelux nations had formed this mutual 
defense organization in 1948 under the title of the Western Union, which had since become 
virtually defunct.
164
  Great Britain saw the WEU as a medium to bring West Germany into 
NATO itself.  The WEU would be able to control Germany‘s manufacture of nuclear, biological, 
and chemical weapons, as well as naval warships and strategic bombers, but would do so as part 
of the larger NATO effort.
165
  In addition, the WEU firmly tied the United Kingdom to the 
continent, assuaging French fears of facing a rearmed Germany on its own.
166
 
The British effort resulted in the London and Paris Conferences (28 September-3 October 
and 20-23 October, respectively).
167
  After negotiating aspects of the British proposal over the 
course of a month, all the major NATO parties agreed to the restoration of full sovereignty to 
West Germany.  On 23 October, the foreign ministers of the NATO countries signed the ―Paris 
Accords,‖ declaring the end of the occupation of West Germany and the recognition of its 
sovereignty under the provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty.
168
  The accords also established 
the goal of a 12-division, 500,000-man army for West Germany.
169
  By the end of 1954, one of 
Eisenhower‘s major policy goals was complete.  Western Europe was more unified than it had 
been since the formation of NATO five years earlier, and this new-found cohesion could 
ultimately result in a decrease in the American ground forces committed to European defense.
170
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Eisenhower‘s experience as SACEUR had convinced him that the only way for the 
United States ever to have a chance to pull its troops out of Europe was to develop a strong 
Franco-German coalition.  This entente between the two former enemies could weld the other 
Western European nations into a strong defense pact that would not rely on heavy American 
assistance.  As SACEUR, Eisenhower believed the EDC had the best chance of laying the 
groundwork for this closer cooperation among the Western Europeans.  Eisenhower saw the 
EDC as the only way to resolve the intricacies present in the current Western European alliance. 
As 1954 progressed and French ratification of the EDC Treaty became unlikely, however, 
Eisenhower refused to investigate other options.  Consequently, when the French National 
Assembly did not ratify the EDC Treaty, the United States was completely unprepared for any 
alternative action.
171
  Eisenhower, through Secretary Dulles, had received Britain‘s WEU-NATO 
proposal just prior to the French vote on the EDC, but stood by the EDC until the end.
172
  In this 
case, it appears that Eisenhower‘s strong stance on the EDC, which grew out his experience as 
NATO Supreme Commander, actually impeded greater European unity instead of securing it.  
Only the actions of the British government secured the admittance of West Germany into NATO 
and greater cohesion among the Western European nations. 
As wrangling over the EDC and later the WEU-NATO compromise continued through 
1954, Eisenhower and his advisers also dealt with the nuclear weapons issue.  The NATO allies 
doubted the wisdom of an increased reliance on nuclear weapons.  Always fearful of a complete 
U.S. withdrawal from Europe, some allied officials believed that reliance on nuclear weapons 
was another step in Eisenhower‘s plan to abandon NATO altogether.  Others had misgivings 
about the strength of the American nuclear guarantee given that the United States faced a 
growing Soviet nuclear arsenal.  In particular, they worried whether America would resort to 
nuclear warfare to save Europe when facing a Soviet counterstrike against the American 
homeland.
173
  Finally, the Soviet detonation of its own thermonuclear device in August 1953 
inspired fears of a European nuclear wasteland in the event of World War III.
174
  At the outset of 
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1954, it was unclear whether the NATO Allies would follow Eisenhower‘s lead in adopting a 
theater nuclear deterrent strategy for Western Europe.  
In October 1953, just as Eisenhower was finalizing NSC-162/2, the Joint Chiefs‘ Annual 
Review reaffirmed that NATO war planning must be based on ―atomic as well as conventional 
weapons‖ and that the alliance must be prepared to counter a Soviet attack ―by atomic 
retaliation.‖175  The Joint Chiefs‘ further concluded that the United States must begin to 
―provision our NATO allies with such atomic information as is required to carry out effective 
planning.‖176  Eisenhower, who thought there were a number of benefits to relying on tactical 
nuclear weapons,
177
 approved NSC-151/2, ―Disclosure of Atomic Information to Allied 
Countries.‖  This document stated that ―the United States should increase its disclosure to 
selected allied governments of information in the atomic energy field.‖178  More specifically, 
―NATO countries should be given an approximation of the kilotonnage and the numbers of 
weapons within various yield ranges which will be available for tactical support of NATO forces 
in the event of war,‖ including ―the tactical use to which the United States would put atomic 
weapons.‖179 
The provisions of NSC-151/2, however, conflicted with the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, 
also known as the McMahon Act.  This act was the basic legislation for providing civilian 
control of atomic energy.  Meant to protect the American nuclear monopoly, the McMahon Act 
included provisions preventing the exchange of nuclear information with foreign governments.
180
  
Both the U.S. Congress and the Joint Chiefs remained hesitant about releasing details on the 
capabilities of the American nuclear arsenal.   
Eisenhower, because of his experiences as SACEUR, argued strongly for the sharing of 
nuclear information with the NATO allies as an extension of his earlier sentiment that ―each 
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[European nation] should be regarded as an equal partner‖ in the defense of Europe.181  Recalling 
his duties at NATO in an NSC meeting on 3 December 1953, Eisenhower stated ―with some 
heat…[that] he had a good deal of experience in dealing with the allies, and…you had to treat 
them as though they were allies.‖182 Eisenhower elaborated by stating that while ―we were not 
obliged to reveal everything,‖ the allies could not be kept in the dark completely.183  The United 
States was ―asking [the] allies to take some pretty terrible risks to stand with America, and ―it 
was certainly incumbent [upon the United States] to give them some good idea of the magnitude 
[of nuclear weapons] which would be available for their defense.‖184  Thus, Eisenhower 
concluded, ―we should be in a position to reveal to them the nature and character of the military 
impact that our atomic weapons could have against an enemy attack.‖185  From these comments, 
it is reasonable to conclude that Eisenhower‘s firsthand experience dealing with the NATO 
countries as SACEUR reinforced his belief that the United States needed to be more open with 
the allies on defense (and especially nuclear) matters.    
Eisenhower sent a special message to Congress the next year and helped to get the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 passed despite initial resistance by Democratic senators representing 
the Tennessee Valley Authority (who were more worried over the commercial development of 
atomic energy than nuclear weapons).
186
  This revision of the 1946 Act liberalized the security 
provisions in several minor ways, allowing the United States to train its allies on how to employ 
nuclear weapons.
187
  Explicitly excluded from this act, however, was authority to share detailed 
information on the manufacture, design, and numbers of atomic weapons.
188
  
Just before Christmas 1953, there had been a NATO Ministers‘ meeting at which Dulles 
first broached the subject of nuclear weapons. In his report to the NSC, Dulles stated that he 
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made ―every effort to get the other NATO ministers to think in something like our terms of 
atomic weapons and of the atomic age.‖189  Dulles explained to the Allies ―how very difficult it 
would be for the United Stated to continue to finance the cost of two separate kinds of armament 
and to plan for two possible kinds of war.‖190  Dulles reiterated that ―our allies must try to 
understand the problem‖ and agree to President Eisenhower‘s views on the nuclear issue.191  
Despite his best efforts, however, Dulles told the NSC that the NATO Allies ―were still very 
frightened at the atomic prospect‖ and that ―the United States would be unable to secure from its 
allies any agreement in advance to the use of [nuclear] weapons.‖192 
Eisenhower and Dulles prepared their statements for the next meeting of the North 
Atlantic Council, scheduled for the end of April 1954.  Eisenhower wanted Dulles to hold a 
single closed session at the meeting to clarify the American position on atomic and 
thermonuclear weapons.
193
  At this meeting, held on 23 April, Dulles summarized Eisenhower‘s 
views by explaining, ―Without the availability for use of atomic weapons, the security of all 
NATO forces in Europe would be in grave jeopardy in the event of a surprise Soviet attack.‖194  
Furthermore, because ―Soviet rulers will make use of atomic weapons with maximum surprise,‖ 
Dulles argued, ―it is indispensible that the free world possesses and maintains a capacity for 
instant and formidable retaliation.‖195  Dulles concluded by declaring: ―It should be our agreed 
policy … to use atomic weapons as conventional weapons against the military assets of the 
enemy.‖196 
Following this meeting, with the American stance on nuclear weapons in Europe clear, 
there remained only a few details left to work out.  For example, the question remained on how 
West Germany would figure into the tactical nuclear weapons scenario.  Eisenhower had 
perceived as SACEUR that, while the French were understandably terrified of a nuclear-capable 
West Germany, the Soviets were even more wary of this prospect.  In fact, Eisenhower thought a 
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nationally manufactured and controlled nuclear arsenal within West Germany itself might trigger 
an immediate Soviet preemptive attack.
197
  Fortunately, the British compromise with the WEU-
NATO transition addressed this specific issue by requiring a majority vote of the Council of the 
Western European Union in order for West Germany to develop any type of nuclear weapon.
198
    
The result was that on 22 November 1954, NATO‘s Military Committee approved MC-
48, ―Resolution on the Most Effective Pattern of NATO Military Strength for the Next Few 
Years.‖199  This document explicitly stated that for the ―foreseeable future…superiority in atomic 
weapons and the capability to deliver them will be the most important factor in a major war.‖  
MC-48 also assumed that NATO would ―use atomic and thermonuclear weapons in defense from 
the outset‖ of any Soviet attack.200  When the Military Committee submitted the document to the 
General Assembly of NATO on 17 December, the Western European allies had come to accept 
Eisenhower‘s views.  The vote on MC-48 was unanimous, and the resolution quickly passed.201 
Eisenhower‘s goals for the implementation of the ―New Look‖ policy had now been 
achieved.  With West Germany‘s formal admission into NATO on 6 May 1955, the European 
allies were much more closely tied together than they had been when Eisenhower entered the 
Oval Office.  Also, with the adoption of MC-48 by the allies, a reliance on tactical nuclear 
weapons (under the strategic nuclear umbrella provided by the United States) became a 
cornerstone of NATO defense strategy.  By the end of 1954, Western Europe was completely in 
line with the defense policy Eisenhower had formulated during his first year in office. 
Eisenhower‘s experiences as NATO Supreme Commander affected the implementation 
of the ―New Look‖ in Europe in a variety of ways.  It was while Eisenhower was acting as 
SACEUR that he had first developed the idea of creating a strong tie between France and 
Germany as the core of a European-led and managed defense pact that would set the groundwork 
for future political cohesion in Western Europe.  Eisenhower while SACEUR accordingly came 
to see that the EDC Treaty offered the best hope to accomplish this goal.  After advocating the 
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EDC while serving as NATO Supreme Commander, Eisenhower as president continued to push 
for the ratification of the treaty.  Even after the EDC became untenable in the summer of 1954, 
Eisenhower‘s NATO service had him so utterly convinced of the need for the EDC as a stepping 
stone for a stronger Western Europe that he ignored other options until the EDC Treaty actually 
failed at the end of August 1954.   
Regarding the nuclear issue, while his SACEUR duties had already reinforced his 
thinking on the necessity of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe,
202
 Eisenhower‘s service at 
NATO Headquarters also shaped how the president sought to integrate nuclear weapons into 
NATO.  Eisenhower could have decided that only the United States should know how to use 
tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.  Eisenhower‘s service as SACEUR gave him a much broader 
approach to the situation.  Judging by his December 1953 comments to the NSC, after working 
with the Western European allies firsthand as SACEUR Eisenhower saw that the United States 
needed to be open with its allies concerning tactical nuclear weapons.  If NATO was ever going 
to adopt a theater nuclear deterrence strategy, it was only logical that the United States share 
information on the capabilities of a nuclear arsenal in Western Europe.  Therefore, Eisenhower‘s 
approach toward tactical nuclear weapons in Western Europe was an inclusive policy involving 
the allies as opposed to an exclusively American venture.  Thus, after helping to shape the ―New 
Look‖ policy itself, Eisenhower‘s experiences as SACEUR also shaped how the president chose 
to implement the major aspects of his policy.   
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CHAPTER 4 - Summary and Conclusions 
No historian writing on Eisenhower and the ―New Look‖ has focused on the continuity of 
Eisenhower‘s thoughts on national defense as SACEUR with his views as president.  Yet there 
are several instances where Eisenhower‘s experiences as SACEUR played an important part in 
Eisenhower‘s thinking on both the ―New Look‖ itself and its implementation in Western Europe.  
This approach also provides a broader understanding of Eisenhower‘s thinking in the first half of 
the 1950s as well as previously unrecognized factors that influenced defense policy in the 
Eisenhower era. 
When Eisenhower accepted the nomination to become SACEUR in December 1950, the 
Cold War was in full swing.  The Soviet Union had solidified its iron grip over its European 
satellites with huge formations of Soviet troops posted in Eastern and Central Europe.
203
  
Meanwhile, the member countries of the NATO alliance were very weak.  The majority of the 
Western European nations had yet to recover fully from the widespread destruction of the 
Second World War.  Rivalries between the allies further complicated the situation by dividing 
the alliance and preventing a coordinated effort toward a stable collective defense.  In short, at 
the end of 1950, serious defense by NATO against any Soviet aggression was nothing but a 
dream. 
As part of Truman‘s strategy to strengthen America‘s allies in Europe, Eisenhower went 
to NATO to increase the cohesion of the Western European nations by building a strong 
international conventional military force.  From January 1951 through May 1952, Eisenhower 
devoted all his energies toward this project, working closely with allied political and military 
leaders to increase the military capability of NATO.  To a large degree, Eisenhower‘s efforts 
were successful.  When Eisenhower left NATO in the spring of 1952, NATO had nearly doubled 
the number of available combat divisions and tripled the number of combat ready aircraft.
204
  
Additionally, the Western Europeans had taken steps toward greater unity with tentative 
agreement to the EDC Treaty. 
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Eisenhower‘s service as SACEUR was not important solely for his accomplishment as 
NATO‘s top military commander.  Eisenhower‘s time at NATO also shaped his thinking on U.S. 
defense policy towards Europe.  When he accepted the nomination to become SACEUR, 
Eisenhower did so because, having previously commanded a coalition in Europe during World 
War II, he agreed with Truman that a strong Western Europe was the cornerstone to future 
American security.  His service at NATO Headquarters reinforced this belief.  Eisenhower left 
NATO confident that Truman‘s approach to Europe had been correct and that NATO could 
continue to grow in strength with future American support.   
Eisenhower also left Europe as a strong supporter of the EDC Treaty.  After working 
tirelessly to resolve the intricacies of the interactions between the Western European nations 
(namely the issue of what to do about West Germany), Eisenhower thought the supra-national 
―European Army‖ concept of the EDC was the only way to create greater cohesion in NATO.  
Eisenhower thought that the international ―European Army,‖ with a strong Franco-German 
coalition at its core, would naturally lead to more cohesion in Western Europe.  These 
observations from Eisenhower‘s service as SACEUR formed the background for his own defense 
policy, as continued support for NATO and the ratification of the EDC became two major goals 
for Eisenhower as president. 
Eisenhower also entered the presidency with very specific ideas on the economy and 
defense spending.  Because he thought the Soviets were not going to attack any time soon, 
Eisenhower assumed that there was no reason to incur what he saw as the likely deficit spending 
of the NSC-68 budgets.  A major reason for the expansion of the defense budget was a planned 
increase in U.S. military personnel.  From his previous service as U.S. Army Chief of Staff in 
1946 during the World War II demobilization, Eisenhower knew that personnel were always the 
largest expense in defense budgets.
205
  Eisenhower therefore presumed he had a strong economic 
incentive to reduce the planned expansion of the U.S. military. 
Eisenhower‘s service as SACEUR reinforced this economic stance while he was 
formulating the ―New Look‖ policy.  As NATO Supreme Commander, Eisenhower was well 
aware of the progress the NATO allies had made to increase their own military capability.  This 
knowledge and further expected increases in NATO‘s military forces likely prompted 
Eisenhower to view a larger American military as unnecessary to Western European defense.  
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Furthermore, Eisenhower‘s experience at NATO Headquarters made him very conscious of the 
European perceptions of American actions.  Eisenhower was aware from the beginning of his 
tour as SACEUR that a large American presence in Europe could cause the allies to drag their 
feet on their own defense commitments.    In essence, the Europeans would clamor for more 
American units instead of providing their own troops.  Eisenhower was wary that building a 
large U.S. military would only serve to increase this sentiment among some of the NATO 
countries.  Thus, Eisenhower‘s experiences as SACEUR served to reinforce his economic stance 
on the desired size of the U.S. military.      
The influence of Eisenhower‘s SACEUR experience dealing with nuclear weapons is less 
clear.  While acting as SACEUR, Eisenhower was exposed to the military possibilities of tactical 
nuclear weapons (i.e., the Project VISTA report and the Joint Chiefs‘ nuclear targeting 
authorization) and later authorized war planning exercises for the use of these weapons in the 
event of war.  Eisenhower was therefore well aware of the advantages offered by tactical nuclear 
weapons in the defense of Western Europe. 
Yet as president, while he made references to the economic benefits of using tactical 
nuclear weapons (nuclear weapons in exchange for manpower, meaning fewer troops and 
smaller defense expenditures), Eisenhower does not appear to have ever specifically referred to 
his experiences at NATO working with nuclear weapons.  It would be strange if Eisenhower, a 
man with a wealth of firsthand military knowledge on the topic of nuclear weapons in Europe, 
never used his personal experience to help determine his defense policy.  It is likely that 
Eisenhower did use this experience but merely left behind little evidence of it. 
Eisenhower‘s experience at NATO also shaped the president‘s realization of this strategy 
in Western Europe.  As described above, Eisenhower left NATO a firm supporter of the EDC 
Treaty.  Eisenhower, like Truman before him, wanted the Western European nations strong 
enough to stand on their own without heavy American aid.  The only way to achieve this was to 
create a greater sense of cohesion among the Western Europeans.   
Eisenhower‘s service at NATO convinced him that EDC was the best way to achieve this 
greater unity.  Eisenhower thought France and Germany (by nature of their population size, 
availability of resources, and geographic location) held the dominating role in a strong Western 
Europe.  Eisenhower explained time and again that, if France and Germany could be welded 
together in pursuit of a single goal, these two nations could provide the core for a successful 
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defense pact in Europe.  Eisenhower thought that the ―European Army‖ provision of the EDC 
would serve perfectly as this single goal, because he believed the pooling of resources towards a 
single military force would lay the groundwork for future political cooperation.  In Eisenhower‘s 
mind, the military program of the EDC was merely a medium for the greater political unity of 
Western Europe. 
As a result, Eisenhower made ratification of the EDC the cornerstone of his policy to 
keep strengthening the NATO countries, and through 1953-1954 Eisenhower pursued this goal 
single-mindedly in his foreign policy in Western Europe.  Even as the chances of ratification 
worsened with increasing French objections to the EDC in the spring and summer of 1954, 
Eisenhower refused to investigate other options.  In fact, it was only after the ratification effort 
completely failed in France in August 1954 that Eisenhower accepted the British proposal to use 
the WEU to integrate West Germany into NATO with full sovereignty.  While the compromise 
lacked the strong Franco-German pact that Eisenhower envisioned, it did bring the NATO 
countries closer together than ever before.  Eisenhower‘s fervent support of the EDC clearly 
originated from his experience as SACEUR and influenced his actions as president. 
Eisenhower‘s duties at NATO also helped shape his position on the integration of tactical 
nuclear weapons in Europe.  In January 1952, the JCS had given Eisenhower nuclear targeting 
authority as SACEUR with the caveat that only American officers were supposed to have the 
classified information on tactical nuclear weapons necessary for planning purposes.
206
  
Eisenhower‘s experiences convinced him this was the wrong approach to take.  As he said on 
several occasions, the only way that NATO was going to work was if the allies were included in 
all aspects of planning for collective defense.  In essence, Eisenhower thought the United States 
needed to trust its allies more than it had up to that point.  Consequently, Eisenhower fought for 
the changes in U.S. laws on the sharing of nuclear information. In due course, Eisenhower 
created an environment where the United States gave the European allies previously withheld 
nuclear information that enabled the NATO allies to participate in nuclear war planning. 
Thus, Eisenhower‘s experiences as SACEUR influenced his thoughts on national defense 
policy as president.  While there were certainly other factors at work (the formation of any 
national defense policy is, after all, a complicated and lengthy process involving more 
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government officials than just the president), it cannot be denied that Eisenhower‘s service at 
NATO helped to clarify his thinking and guide his actions while in the Oval Office.   
The purpose of this essay has not been to discount other interpretations regarding the 
―New Look‖ policy; rather, the goal has been to expand the interpretative framework on the 
subject.  Other historians have only briefly mentioned Eisenhower‘s service as the NATO 
Supreme Commander, but this work has shown how crucial this experience was to Eisenhower‘s 
thoughts on the ―New Look.‖             
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